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ABSTRACT 
 
Chief Judge Rader’s judicial opinions contribute 
significantly to patent infringement jurisprudence. He 
writes from a teacher’s perspective, providing context and 
a clear lens through which legal issues may be examined. 
His deep reverence for the rule of law pervades his 
opinions, as he injects a cadre of principles governing his 
approach. Each opinion builds a foundation made of 
consistency and clarity in upholding the fundamental 
purposes underlying the patent grant. 
  
                                                                                                         
* Professor White has a B.S.E. in Electrical Engineering and Computer 
Science from Princeton University, a J.D. from the University of Washington, 
and an LL.M. from George Washington University Law School. From 1995-
1996, she served as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Randall R. Rader, 
Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Professor White is 
currently a Professor of Law at the Wayne State University Law School in 
Detroit. She also serves as a Lt. Colonel in the U.S. Army reserves, currently as 
an Instructor of Law at the United States Military Academy at West Point, NY. 
Appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture, she serves on the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture Plant Variety Protection Board (2004-2008, 2010-Present). In 
addition, she is a statewide elected member of the University of Michigan Board 
of Regents (1999-Present), a Fulbright Senior Scholar (1999-2000 Max Planck 
Institute, Munich, Germany), a White House Fellow (2001-2002), a former 
member of the United States Patent and Trademark Office Patent Public 
Advisory Committee (2000-2002), and a registered patent attorney. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
After leaving active duty from the United States Army Judge 
Advocate General’s Corps, I was extraordinarily fortunate to serve 
a judicial clerk with the Honorable Randall R. Rader, now Chief 
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit. Through this invaluable experience, I learned the 
importance of developing a cadre of principles for approaching 
legal issues, not only analytically, but also in writing text. Building 
a foundation of knowledge to draw on and build upon in one’s 
written work demonstrates the proper respect for the monumental 
responsibility of writing judicial opinions. 
Chief Judge Rader’s judicial opinions have many admirable 
qualities. Most impressive is his profound belief in the significant 
role judicial opinions have in preserving our society’s adherence to 
the rule of law. In his opinions there is reverence for the weight of 
that responsibility as well as an acute awareness of the importance 
of clarity. His strong conviction to create a consistent body of work 
that provides public notice of the state of the law is admirable and 
principled. 
 As George Harrison said in his song, “Any Road,” “[i]f you do 
not know where you are going, any road will take you there.”1
                                                                                                         
1 GEORGE HARRISON, Any Road, on BRAINWASHED (Dark Horse 2003). 
This refrain is considered a paraphrase of a conversation between Alice and 
Cheshire Cat in LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 89 
(Macmillian Company 1897) (1865). 
 
"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?" 
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When drafting judicial opinions, it is important both to understand 
and to provide context. Consequently, as a judge you must know 
where you have been and why. You must also know where you are 
and how you got there. Finally, you must know where you want to 
go, why you want to go there, and the best way to get there. Judges 
must develop an approach to examine complicated legal issues that 
informs a direction consistent with where one wants to take the 
law, and at the same time, remains faithful to precedent. Although 
this may seem apparent to experts in exegesis (the critical 
interpretation of text), when drafting judicial opinions there is 
often a temptation to address issues haphazardly without regard for 
the negative impact clumsiness in word choice or rationale can 
have on judicial opinions. 
Although Chief Judge Rader maintains the aforementioned 
characteristics in his opinions in all different areas of law, I only 
focus on his contributions in a sampling of patent infringement 
cases in this presentation. In reviewing patent infringement 
judgments, Chief Judge Rader’s judicial opinions demonstrate 
consistency, clarity, predictability, and public notice as optimal 
qualities. Generally, recognizing the fundamental purpose 
underlying the patent grant and how it informs the outcome of the 
judgment is the primary consideration. Likewise, Chief Judge 
Radar acknowledges the role of the judiciary and how it differs 
from the Congressional role in the background of his opinions; it is 
as powerful as the undertow that pushes seaward. 
Not only is Chief Judge Rader’s writing ideology conducive to 
scripting judicial opinions, it also benefits teachers who can use his 
opinions as “signposts on the road.” Chief Judge Rader, a professor 
himself, provides context and history in every opinion. He creates 
a map of where we have been that helps us better understand where 
we are going and why. His opinions are unique because he always 
pulls everything together in one opinion so it all fits on one map.  
                                                                                                         
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat. 
"I don’t much care where--" said Alice. 
"Then it doesn’t matter which way you go," said the Cat. 
"--so long as I get somewhere," Alice added as an explanation. 
"Oh, you’re sure to do that," said the Cat, "if you only walk long 
enough." 
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Below is a sampling of the patent infringement cases where the 
aforementioned principles informed Chief Judge Rader’s judicial 
opinions. 
 
I. AT&T CORP. V. MICROSOFT CORP.2
 
 
AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. raised issues regarding the 
extraterritoriality of the patent laws reminiscent of those addressed 
decades earlier in Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp.3 
To circumvent the patent laws, the defendant in Deepsouth sold 
components of a shrimp deveiner abroad that, if sold in 
combination in the United States, would have been a direct 
infringement under § 271(a).4 The defendant’s intent was for the 
components to be combined abroad, as they could be easily 
assembled in less than an hour.5 The issue concerned whether the 
defendant, while barred from the American market because of the 
plaintiff’s patents, was “also foreclosed . . . from exporting its 
deveiners, in less than fully assembled form, for use abroad.”6 The 
Supreme Court held the patent laws “make[] no claim to 
extraterritorial effect; ‘these acts of Congress do not, and were not 
intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United States.’”7 In 
finding that the patent laws are explicitly limited to national 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court signaled to Congress that only the 
legislature has the authority to grant extraterritorial jurisdiction of 
the patent laws.8 In response to Deepsouth, Congress enacted  
§ 271(f), which expanded the territorial reach of U.S. patent laws.9
                                                                                                         
2 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T 
Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
  
3 406 U.S. 518 (1972). 
4 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). 
5 Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 524. 
6 Id. at 519. 
7 Id. at 531 (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856)).  
8 Id. at 530. 
9 Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1360 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (“describing Section 271(f) as a response to the ‘Deepsouth 
decision which interpreted the patent law not to make it infringement where the 
final assembly and sale is abroad’”) (quoting Patent Law Amendments of 1984, 
S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 2-3 (1984). The section states:   
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Decades later, in AT&T, the Federal Circuit faced a challenge 
to the extraterritorial reach of § 271(f). In that case, AT&T’s 
patents covered an apparatus for digitally encoding and 
compressing recorded speech. Microsoft incorporated potentially 
infringing software into its Windows operating system. To avoid 
infringement on a massive scale, Microsoft sent its foreign 
licensees master versions of its Windows software, either via 
“golden master” disks or electronic transmission, for replication 
abroad.10
(1) May software be a component of a patented 
invention under 271(f),
 AT&T sued for patent infringement. Microsoft defended 
by contending that liability does not attach unless a master disk or 
electronic transmission sent from the United States is in fact 
incorporated into a foreign-assembled computer abroad, which did 
not occur. In order to resolve this dispute, the Federal Circuit 
addressed two issues:  
11
(2) Are copies of software replicated abroad from a 
master version exported from the United States—
with the intent that it be replicated—deemed 
 and  
                                                                                                         
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or 
from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of 
a patented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole 
or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such 
components outside of the United States in a manner that would 
infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United 
States, shall be liable as an infringer. 
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or 
from the United States any component of a patented invention that is 
especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a 
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial 
noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined in whole or in 
part, knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending 
that such component will be combined outside of the United States in a 
manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred 
within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (emphasis added). 
10 AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
11 Id. at 1369. 
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supplied for purposes of 271(f)?12
To answer the first question, the court looked to a prior Rader 
opinion written a few months earlier, Eolas Technologies Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp.
  
13 That case held that software code qualifies as a 
patent eligible invention and that § 271(f) does not limit its 
language to patented machines or structures. Thus, software may 
be a component of a patented invention for purposes of § 271(f).14 
But unlike the combination in Eolas, where the actual disks 
exported were incorporated into the foreign computers, in AT&T 
only copies made abroad of the exported Windows software were 
installed on foreign-assembled computers.15 These computers were 
then sold to foreign customers, not domestic ones. Nevertheless, 
the Federal Circuit, with Judge Rader in dissent, found the “act of 
copying is subsumed in the act of ‘supplying,’ [and sending one 
copy abroad] with the intent that it be replicated invokes § 271(f) 
liability . . . . ”16
Judge Rader dissented, recognizing that the panel’s definition 
of supplying a component would give “rise to endless liability in 
the United States under § 271(f) for products manufactured 
entirely abroad.”
  
17 He also disagreed with the majority because the 
ease of copying was “not the proper basis for making distinctions 
under § 271(f).”18 Referring to his prior opinion in Eolas,19 Judge 
Rader cited to the TRIPs20
                                                                                                         
12 Id. 
 Agreement, which states generally that 
patent rights shall be enjoyed without discrimination as to the field 
13 Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
14 AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1369 (citing Eolas Techs. Inc., 399 F.3d at 
1339). 
15 Id. at 1369. 
16 Id. at 1370. 
17 Id. at 1372 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
18 Id. at 1374. 
19 Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1339. 
20 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE RESULTS OF 
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs]. 
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of technology.21 In contrast, the majority treated software 
inventions differently from other subject matter, contravening both 
precedent and TRIPs. Appropriately, to address the conflict in 
precedent and the jeopardized path to predictability, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and resolved the inconsistency by 
reversing the Federal Circuit, citing to Judge Rader’s dissent in the 
process.22
The Court agreed with Judge Rader, noting that “nothing in 
§ 271(f)’s text . . . renders ease of copying a relevant . . . factor in 
triggering liability for infringement.”
  
23 Further agreeing, the Court 
stated that Congress is no doubt aware how easy it is to copy 
software and any change in the law should be made after careful 
legislative deliberation, “and not by the [j]udiciary forecasting 
Congress’ likely disposition.”24 Just like in Deepsouth,25
 
 the 
Supreme Court signaled to Congress to change the fundamentals of 
the law, as is its role. 
II. BMC RESOURCES, INC. V. PAYMENTECH, LP26
 
 
BMC appealed a summary judgment finding of non-
infringement of two of its patents on a method for processing debit 
transactions without a personal identification number (PIN).27 The 
trial court found that Paymentech, the alleged infringer, had 
performed some, but not all, of the steps in the averred method 
claims.28 Instead, other parties performed the remainder of the 
claimed method steps.29
                                                                                                         
21 TRIPs, Part II, § 5 (“Patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable 
without discrimination as to the place of invention . . . [and] the field of 
technology”). 
 This case presented the opportunity to 
22 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 453 (2007). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 459. 
25 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972) 
(“[T]he sign of how far Congress has chosen to go [regarding the infringement 
of combination patents abroad] can come only from Congress.”). 
26 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
27 Id. at 1375. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 1378.   
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address the requirements for proving direct or indirect 
infringement of a method claim, when no one party performs all 
the steps of the patented method invention. To address this 
question, two issues had to be resolved: first, whether direct 
infringement of method claims requires each step in the claim to be 
performed, and second, whether vicarious liability for the acts of 
other parties requires control over of the conduct of the other 
parties.30
The case law on whether each step of a method claim must be 
performed for direct infringement liability is a well-settled issue: 
“[Direct] infringement occurs when a party performs all of the 
steps of the process.”
  
31 The standards for vicarious liability, 
however, had been apparently muddied by an earlier Federal 
Circuit case, On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Industries, 
Inc.32 By not directly analyzing the infringement, the On Demand 
court ostensibly affirmed a jury instruction that was perceived as 
an inaccurate description of Federal Circuit precedent by BMC.33
On Demand could be interpreted as conceding that joint 
infringers are jointly liable for infringement in cases where neither 
infringer performs all of the claimed steps. Consequently, to show 
   
                                                                                                         
30 See id. at 1379-80. 
31 Id. at 1379 (citing Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993). 
32 On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). 
33 The language in On Demand, reads: 
It is not necessary for the acts that constitute infringement to 
be performed by one person or entity. When infringement 
results from the participation and combined action(s) of more 
than one person or entity, they are all joint infringers and 
jointly liable for patent infringement. Infringement of a 
patented process or method cannot be avoided by having 
another perform one step of the process or method.  Where the 
infringement is the result of the participation and combined 
action(s) of one or more persons or entities, they are joint 
infringers and are jointly liable for the infringement. 
On Demand, 442 F.3d at 1344-45; see also BMC, 498 F.3d at 1379-80 (stating 
the court merely discerned no flaw in the instructions above as a statement of 
law, but did so without any analysis of the issues related to divided 
infringement). 
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vicarious liability, there would be no requirement for one infringer 
to have control over the other. Judge Rader writes for the court in 
BMC, dispelling this misconception and clearly articulating the 
following standards: 
(1) “Infringement requires, as it always has, a 
showing that a defendant has practiced each and 
every element of the claimed invention.”34
(2) Where a party is engaged in indirect 
infringement, “this court has held that inducement 
of infringement requires a predicate finding of 
direct infringement.”
 
35
(3) “A party cannot avoid infringement . . . simply 
by contracting out steps of a patented process to 
another entity. . . . The party in control [is] liable for 
direct infringement.”
 
36
In other words, regarding points one and two, properly 
pleading an act of indirect infringement, including either active 
inducement infringement under § 271(b)
 
37 or contributory 
infringement under § 271(c),38 requires alleging an act of direct 
infringement. Rather than merely stating this point like prior cases 
have, Judge Rader explains why this requirement exists by 
exploring the statutory scheme for indirect infringement. Because 
“[d]irect infringement is a strict-liability offense, . . . it is limited to 
those who practice each and every element of the claimed 
invention.”39
                                                                                                         
34 BMC, 498 F.3d at 1380 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton-Davis 
Chem. Corp., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997)).   
 On the other hand, active inducement infringement is 
not a strict liability offense. Instead, active inducement requires 
showing specific intent to induce infringement, yet it does not call 
for each and every element of the claimed invention to be infringed 
by the inducer. Similarly, contributory infringement, also not a 
35 Id. (citing Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 
1272 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
36 Id. at 1381. 
37 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). 
38 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 
39 BMC, 498 F.3d at 1381. 
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strict-liability offense, requires knowledge of sales of components 
or materials without having substantial non-infringing uses.40 In 
adhering to and discussing the purpose behind § 271(a) versus 
indirect infringement under § 271(c), the court addresses strict 
liability versus the knowledge or intent requirements.41
BMC is a wonderful case to use when teaching about patent 
enforcement litigation. It is often difficult to explain to students 
how to properly plead a claim of contributory infringement 
because, to plead correctly, one must allege one act of direct 
infringement.  
  
 
III. DSU MEDICAL CORP. V. JMS CO.42
 
 
The en banc court in DSU looked at the Supreme Court opinion 
in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,43 where the Court 
established the standard for active inducement infringement in 
copyright cases and resolved conflicting precedent.44 As with 
previous Supreme Court cases over the last decade and a half, the 
Court signaled its disapproval for carving out special rules that 
treat patent cases differently when precedent incorporates 
traditional notions of equity, intent, and willfulness.45
                                                                                                         
40 Id.  
 
41 Id.; see Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) (opinion written by Judge Rader states that 271(f)(2) only requires 
intent that components will be combined abroad and that it does not incorporate 
the doctrine of contributory infringement).  Although an act of direct 
infringement need not be alleged, 271(f)(2) is not a strict liability standard.  
Intent is required.  Thus, when not infringing each and every element of the 
invention, knowledge or intent is required, as BMC advises.  See BMC, 498 F.3d 
at 1381. 
42 471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
43 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005). 
44 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934-36 (requiring active steps in encouraging 
infringement to prove inducement). 
45 See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 56-59 (2007) (setting 
forth a general standard for willfulness includes recklessness); eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006) (traditional notions of 
equity should be applied to decisions to grant permanent injunctions); MGM 
Studios, 545 U.S. at 934-36. See generally MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 
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In order to incorporate these longstanding principles, Judge 
Rader, writing for the court, resolved conflicting precedent 
regarding the requirements for proving active inducement 
infringement.46 Although DSU is a panel opinion, it has an en banc 
component, Section III. B. It addressed the requirement in 
Grokster that inducement includes active steps encouraging 
infringement.47
In DSU, Judge Rader addressed three guiding principles or 
rules resolving conflicting precedent involving required intent for 
proving active inducement infringement:  
 
(1) To prove inducement, the plaintiff has the 
burden of showing the alleged infringer “knew or 
should have known his actions would induce actual 
infringement.”48
(2) Proving inducement necessarily requires 
showing that the alleged infringer knew of the 
patent.
 
49
(3) Plaintiff must prove that once the alleged 
infringers “knew of the patent, they ‘actively and 
knowingly aid[ed] and abett[ed] another’s direct 
infringement.’”
 
50 In other words, “specific intent 
and action to induce infringement”51 is required; 
mere “‘knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute 
infringement’ is not enough.”52
Although DSU finally clarified Federal Circuit precedent, in 
 
                                                                                                         
549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
46 DSU, 471 F.3d at 1305. 
47 Id. at 1304-06 (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934-36). 
48 Id. at 1304. 
49 Id. (citing Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 
1364 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2006).   
50 Id. (quoting Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988)) (modifications in original). 
51 Id.  
52 DSU, 471 F.3d at 1305. (quoting Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 
316 F.3d 1348, 1363  (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
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Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,53 the Supreme Court 
clarified the knowledge threshold required to prove active 
inducement infringement. The Court recognized that both the 
language in 271(b) and the pre-1952 case law were “susceptible to 
conflicting interpretations” of the intent required to show 
inducement.54 The Court held that the same knowledge needed to 
show contributory infringement was required for active 
inducement infringement.55 The Court adopted the “willful 
blindness” standard in criminal law as the required proof that the 
alleged infringer acted knowingly and willfully to induce 
infringement.56
The Court noted that “willful blindness” is a 
concept holding defendants who “deliberately 
shield[] themselves from clear evidence” as 
criminally liable “as those who have actual 
knowledge.”
 
57 The Court stated that “willful 
blindness” has two basic requirements: (1) the 
defendant must subjectively believe that there is a 
high probability that a fact exists and (2) the 
defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid 
learning of that fact.58
The Court clarifies that “willful blindness” is more limited in 
scope than recklessness or negligence. With “willful blindness,” it 
is almost as if the defendant actually knew of the wrongdoing; 
“[b]y contrast, a reckless defendant is one who merely knows of a 
substantial and unjustified risk of such wrongdoing . . . .”
 
59
The Supreme Court’s test departs from the Federal Circuit’s 
test in two ways. First, the Federal Circuit permits a finding of 
 
                                                                                                         
53 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). 
54 Id. at 2067. 
55 Id. at 2068 (noting 271(b) and 271(c) “have a common origin in the pre-
1952 understanding of contributory infringement,” and thus both should have 
same meaning). 
56 Id. at 2068-69. 
57 Id. at 2069 (citing J. LI. J. Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 
17 MOD. L. REV. 294, 302 (1954)).   
58 Global-Tech. Appliances, 131 S. Ct. at 2070. 
59 Id. at 2071. 
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knowledge when there is merely a “‘known risk’ that the induced 
acts are infringing.”60 Second, the Federal Circuit’s test “does not 
require active efforts by the inducer to avoid knowing about the 
infringing nature of the activities.”61
 
 
IV. JOHNSON & JOHNSTON ASSOCS. INC. V.  
R.E. SERVICE CO., INC.62
 
 
The Federal Circuit case Johnson & Johnston Associates Inc. v. 
R.E. Service Co., Inc. involves the patentee’s invention for an 
assembly tool that prevents damage to thin sheets of copper foil 
that are used in making circuit boards as workers manually handle 
the sheets during the layering process. The invention is a stiff 
substrate that adheres to the fragile copper foil, thereby protecting 
it from damage.63 The patent specification discloses aluminum as 
the preferred substrate, but also lists other metals, such as stainless 
steel or nickel alloys.64 Although the patent discloses the use of 
other metals, it does not claim their use, instead only claiming 
aluminum.65 RES, a competitor, instead of using aluminum as a 
substrate, used steel. The patentee sued RES for patent 
infringement. RES cited Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc.66 as a 
foundation for its argument that the steel substrate is dedicated to 
the public because the patentee disclosed but did not claim steel. 
Maxwell prohibits expanding claim scope in a non-textual 
infringement analysis to cover material disclosed, but not 
claimed.67 The patentee disagreed, citing YBM Magnex, Inc. v. 
International Trade Commission,68
                                                                                                         
60 Id. 
 where a similar magnet alloy 
61 Id. 
62 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
63 Id. at 1049. 
64 Id. at 1050. 
65 Id. at 1051.   
66 86 F.3d 1098, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding “subject matter disclosed 
but not claimed in a patent application is dedicated to the public”) (quoting 
Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
67 Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1106. 
68 YBM Magnex, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 145 F.3d 1317, 1321 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (limiting Maxwell to instances where an unclaimed alternative is 
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differed from the claimed alloy in its oxygen content.69 YBX limits 
Maxwell to cases where an unclaimed alternative is disclosed and 
is distinct from the claimed invention. YBX also affirmatively 
states Maxwell “did not create a new rule of law that doctrine of 
equivalents could never encompass subject matter disclosed in the 
specification but not claimed.”70
To resolve the conflict in precedent, the Federal Circuit took 
Johnson en banc and held that “when a patent drafter discloses but 
declines to claim subject matter,”
  
 71 the unclaimed subject matter is 
dedicated to the public. The court also overruled any portion of 
YBX that was inconsistent with its ruling in Johnson.72
 Judge Rader’s concurrence, in which then-Chief Judge Mayer 
joined, articulates the crucial public and notice function of patent 
claims that the Supreme Court describes in Warner-Jenkinson Co. 
v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
 Judge 
Rader wrote separately to further identify and clarify the 
competing interests involved when unclaimed alternatives are 
disclosed in a patent. 
73 In his concurrence, Judge Rader 
reconciles the “preeminent notice function of patent claims with 
the protective function of the doctrine of equivalents.”74
He emphasizes that the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents 
is to prevent the unscrupulous copyist from escaping 
infringement.
 
75 The doctrine of equivalents, however, must be 
balanced as to not upset the notice function of claim language. The 
patentee should be prevented from capturing equivalents the 
“drafter reasonably could have foreseen during the application 
process and included in the claims.”76
                                                                                                         
disclosed that is distinct from the claimed invention). 
 Judge Rader mentions that 
the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have addressed this conflict 
through limiting non-textual infringement to require an equivalent 
69 Id. at 1319. 
70 Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1051 (citing YBX, 145 F.3d at 1321). 
71 Id. at 1054. 
72 Id. at 1055. 
73 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997). 
74 Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring). 
75 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 
(1950). 
76 Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J. concurring). 
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for each and every element of a patent claim.77
To further balance these juxtaposed goals, Judge Rader 
suggests an additional limitation for analyzing non-textual 
infringement. When a skilled artisan “in the relevant art would 
foresee coverage of an invention, a patent drafter has an obligation 
to claim those foreseeable limits.”
 
78 In that way, the definitional 
and notice function of the claims are further preserved, thereby 
encompassing the entire claim scope for all foreseeable 
circumstances.79 In essence, Judge Rader advocates providing a 
foreseeability bar as a way to boost the notice function of claims.80 
As he makes this suggestion, he hearkens back to a prior case he 
wrote for the court, Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc.,81
 
 
which articulates this principle. 
V. SAGE PRODUCTS, INC. V. DEVON INDUSTRIES, INC. 
 
In Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc., the patentee 
disclosed a disposal container to safely deposit sharp medical 
waste without touching the waste already present in the 
container.82 Sage claimed its invention clumsily by requiring “an 
elongated slot at the top of the container body for permitting access 
to the interior of the container body.”83 The alleged infringer’s 
elongated slot, however, lies within the container body, not on top 
of it.84 Sage therefore could not prove literal infringement and so it 
sought to find Devon liable for infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents. Devon relied on Warner-Jenkinson85
                                                                                                         
77 Id. at 1056-57 (Rader, J. concurring) (citations omitted). 
 when it asserted 
that “the doctrine of equivalents d[id] not grant Sage license to 
78 Id. at 1057 (Rader, J. concurring). 
79 Id.  
80 Id. 
81 126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
82 Id. at 1422. 
83 Id.. (emphasis removed).  
84 Id. at 1423. 
85 Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 
(“It is important to ensure that the application of the doctrine, even as to an 
individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate 
that element in its entirety.”). 
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remove entirely the ‘top of the container’ and ‘over said slot’ 
limitations from the claim.”86
The question to the court, then, was who should bear the risk of 
loss as “between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to 
negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and the public at 
large.”
 Devon’s position was, in effect, that 
if a patentee claims narrowly, but could have claimed more 
broadly, the doctrine of equivalents should not be a vehicle for 
fixing ineptly drafted claim language.  
87 The court stated that the patentee must bear the risk of 
loss:88 “If Sage desired broad patent protection for any container 
that performed a function similar to its claimed container, it could 
have sought claims with fewer structural encumbrances.”89 A 
premium is placed on forethought in patent drafting.90
Another important statement in the opinion holds the patent 
drafter’s feet to the fire regarding the importance of ensuring that 
what is said during prosecution must be consistent with what is 
said when arguing for equivalents: 
 
Where a patent claim recites a specific function for 
an element of the claim and the written description 
reiterates the importance of that particular function, 
a patentee may not later argue, during the course of 
litigation, that an accused device lacking that 
functionality is equivalent.91
The entire opinion reflects on the public notice function of 
claims, which will limit a patentee’s ability to circumvent what it 
initially claimed and later obtain broader coverage through 
equivalents. In other words, the patent grant is not a carte blanche 
to capture patent protection where none was conceived. 
 
 
                                                                                                         
86 Sage Prods., 126 F.3d at 1424. 
87 Id. at 1425. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1429-30 (citing Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 
931, 938 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).  
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VI. ABBOT LABORATORIES V. SANDOZ, INC.92
 
 
In Abbot Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc.,93 the Federal Circuit, en 
banc, clarified the scope of product-by-process claims by adopting 
the rule in an earlier Rader opinion, Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. 
Faytex Corp.94 In that case, Judge Rader, writing for the panel, 
criticized the rule in Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. 
Genentech, Inc.,95 which stated “the correct reading of product-by-
process claims is that they are not limited to product prepared by 
the process set forth in the claims.”96 The court justified rejecting 
this rule because the rule need not be followed if the court 
determines that the prior panel would have reached a different 
conclusion if it had considered controlling precedent.97
Recognizing the need to resolve the conflict in precedent, 
Judge Rader, writing for the court, held that the scope of product-
by-process claims in patent infringement determinations is limited 
by the recited process terms, and in so doing finally overruled and 
laid to rest Scripps Clinic.
 
98 The Abbot opinion clarified that 
limiting language in the specification will not be read into the 
claims unless there is a clear and intentional disavowal of claim 
scope.99 But, the proper reading of product-by-process claims 
incorporates process limitations in defining claim scope for 
infringement purposes.100
 
 
                                                                                                         
92 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
93 Id. (en banc as to the cited issue). 
94 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In that case, Judge Rader, writing for the 
panel, criticized the rule in Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, 
Inc., which stated “the correct reading of product-by-process claims is that they 
are not limited to product prepared by the process set forth in the claims.”  
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991), overruled by Abbot Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (en banc). 
95 Id. at 1565. 
96 Id. at 1583. 
97 Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d 838 n. 2. 
98 Id. at 838.  
99 Abbot Labs., 566 F.3d at 1290. 
100 Id. at 1292.   
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CONCLUSION 
  
Chief Judge Rader’s judicial opinions contribute significantly 
to patent infringement jurisprudence. He writes from a teacher’s 
perspective, providing context and a clear lens through which legal 
issues may be examined. His deep reverence for the rule of law 
pervades his opinions, as he injects a cadre of principles governing 
his approach. Each opinion builds a foundation made of 
consistency and clarity in upholding the fundamental purposes 
underlying the patent grant. 
